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Vector-borne diseases continue to be endemic in many parts of the world with 
dengue, malaria, chikungunya, and yellow fever affecting millions of people every year. 
Recent advances in genetic engineering, such as CRISPR, have allowed for faster and 
cheaper DNA modification in organisms with potential to suppress the ability to transmit 
or carry these pathogens. Additionally, gene drive mechanisms that increase the 
inheritance rates of transgenic DNA have been proposed, which enable the release of very 
few transgenic organisms to be capable of transforming entire wild populations. The 
results of such actions could be irreversible with long-term consequences unknown.  
Methods to remove transgene DNA have been explored in crops systems and 
human gene therapy applications. However, such DNA self-elimination mechanisms have 
not yet been considered to control highly active gene drive transgenes. Here we explore 
the coupling of three potential gene drive mechanisms (CRISPR, MEDEA, and 
underdominance) and a proposed self-eliminating mechanism with system dynamics 
modeling. Our results identify effective parameter spaces for the complete removal of 
transgenic DNA and restoration of wild-type alleles for all three gene drive mechanisms.  
Combining gene drive approached with a self-elimination mechanism could allow testing 
the effects of transgenic populations on the environment, preventing the long-term 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Infectious diseases continue to plague human and domestic animal populations 
across the world. Vector-borne diseases, such as those spread by mosquitoes, fleas, and 
ticks, account for 17% of all infectious diseases and are endemic through the world1–5. 
Many mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria (spread by female Anopheles mosquitoes), 
dengue, chikungunya, and Zika virus (spread by female Aedes mosquitoes), impact nearly 
half of the human population6–9. In 2017, malaria alone caused an estimated 219 million 
infections resulting in 435,000 deaths10. Furthermore, increasing temperatures has 
expanded the suitable ranges for many vector species, exposing more people to the threat 
of the transmission of these diseases11–15. 
Advances in genome editing, have allowed for an insertion or removal of particular 
genes to influence the expression of various traits within an organism. In particular, the 
discovery and advance of clustered regularly interspace palindromic repeats (CRISPR) 
and the CRISPR-associated protein (Cas9) system has allowed for the modification of 
precise segments of DNA to be conducted cheaper and more rapidly than previously 
possible16–20.  
The genetic modification of an organism has been proposed as a potential solution 
to stop or limit vector-borne diseases in endemic areas by impacting the organism’s ability 
to carry and transmit disease21–23. Studies targeting mosquito species to prevent the 




dengue have shown promising results24–26. Other approaches have focused on reducing the 
population size of vector species through the release of sterile individuals27 or genetically 
engineered individuals that have reduced reproductive or survival rates28,29. While both 
techniques are successful in reducing the number of individuals, the effects only persist 
for a few generations before the natural population is restored30–33. Hence, these 
techniques must be applied multiple times to increase their effectiveness over time. 
Other approaches focused on the propagation of transgenes throughout a 
population have also been developed. Gene drives (GD) are selfish inheritance 
mechanisms that allowed for the deviation from Mendelian inheritance rates by increasing 
the likelihood that certain traits are passed from the parents to progeny. As a result, these 
mechanisms ensure that a transgene is able to persist34. In heterozygous individuals, 
homing drive constructs, such as CRISPR/Cas9-based gene drives, work by creating a 
double stranded break (DSB) at the same location on the opposing chromosome and 
through homology directed repair (HDR), copying the transgenic material into the break 
location, using the transgenic chromosome as a template35–38. This effectively creates 
transgenic homozygous individuals from the heterozygous gametes inherited from the 
parents. Since HDR is not ensured following a DSB, repair by NHEJ can result in resistant 
alleles, impairing the effectiveness of the GD38–40. Other GD mechanisms such as 
maternal-effect dominant embryonic arrest (MEDEA)41,42 and maternal-effect lethal 
underdominance (UD)43 utilize a maternally-linked toxin to ensure only offspring 




Gene drive mechanisms are designed to spread and persist in a population. While 
gene drives are currently strictly limited to confined laboratory settings, several concerns 
must be addressed before a release of organisms containing gene drive constructs into the 
environment can occur. Due to the permanent nature of gene drives, an environmental 
release of gene drive carrying organisms may be irreversible with the consequences 
unknown. The regulation of such biotechnologies must work to address the adverse risks 
a release of these organisms would have on the environment; however, without 
environmental releases, the full effects may not be observed. 
Several studies have been conducted on removal of transgenic DNA sequences 
from the pollen and seed of transgenic plants to prevent the spread of transgenic DNA as 
a result of cross-fertilization of closely related wild or nontransgenic plants44. Similarly, 
applications in human gene therapy represent an emerging new gene delivery technology 
with the ability facilitate scarless transgenic excision, reducing chances of deleterious 
reintegration45,46. 
Excision of DNA segments has been demonstrated through the use of transposable 
elements, recombinases, and single-strand annealing (SSA) following two nuclease-
induced DSB. Excision facilitated by transposases such as piggyBac and p-elements 
enable the complete removal of DNA segments located on the transposon between two 
inverted terminal repeats (ITR)45–50. Through recombination, such as the Cre/loxP and 
FLP/FRT systems used in recombinase-mediated cassette exchange (RMCE), the 
recombinase binds and removes the segment of DNA between the two target sites leaving 




DSB at two target sites flanked by direct repeats (DR), excising the DNA between cuts, 
with single-strand annealing (SSA) rejoining the DNA56,57. While these studies have 
demonstrated the removal of transgenic material, these have not been studied in 
combination with GD systems. 
The regulation of biotechnologies such as gene drives must strike a balance 
between the benefits and hazards of utilizing this emerging technology. While the use of 
gene drives may enable the suppression of disease or conservation of endangered species, 
there is uncertainty pertaining to how transgenic organisms will behave in the wild and 
what impacts these organisms may have on the health of the environment 58. Furthermore, 
since gene drives are designed to persist in the environment, the abilities to contain gene 
drive carrying organisms and stop or reverse the spread of the gene drive must be 
considered prior to any release into the environment58–60.  
By introducing a genetic construct with both GD and SEM functionality, we 
explored the possible impacts of the CRISPR, MEDEA, and UD gene drive mechanisms 
on the wild-type population when paired with an SEM construct. We explore effective 
elimination rates that allow for the transgenic DNA to drive into the population with a 
subsequent restoration of the wild-type population within a short time frame. Our findings 
show that by using an SEM to remove an introduced gene drive construct, the 
pervasiveness of the gene drive can be limited and the wild-type population can be restored 








The concept of a transgene “driving” throughout a population was first proposed 
by Curtis in 196834, where the use of chromosomal translocations would allow for the 
spread of wanted traits (such as the inability to transmit disease in mosquitoes) and upon 
reaching fixation in the population, would protect the area from immigrants. Drive 
mechanisms utilizing homing endonuclease genes (HEGs) propose the use of drive 
constructs inducing a DSB on the same location on the opposing chromosome and copying 
the transgenic material39,61. With the discovery of CRISPR, CRISPR-based gene drives 
have been achieved in fruit flies62 and mosquitoes 35,36. However, the CRISPR-based gene 
drive is limited by the formation of resistance alleles if successful HDR does not occur63. 
To reduce the rate of resistance allele formation, Noble et al. proposed a multiple gRNA 
gene drive, allowing for multiple chances for a successful HDR to occur, which ensured a 
stronger and more permanent drive of the transgene. A different approach demonstrated 
by Kyrou et al.64 aimed to reduce the presence of resistance alleles by targeting the 
doublesex (dsx) gene in Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes. As a result, the formation of 
resistance alleles and homologous transgene expression disrupted the development of 
females, but not males. Since there was no disruption in males, the drive spread through 
the population, biasing against females, ultimately decreasing egg production and 
eliminating the entire laboratory cage population. With high rates of inducing a DSB and 
HDR, both approaches are capable of achieve gene drive with the introduction of very few 




Other gene drive mechanisms spread by causing mortality in the offspring through 
parentally-linked toxins. The MEDEA construct utilizes a maternally-linked toxin, where 
the drive elements are spread by causing mortality to offspring of MEDEA-carrying 
females that do not inherit the transgene (antidote)65,66. Applications and modeling for 
Drosophila indicated an initial release of 25% of homozygous MEDEA-bearing males 
was sufficient to induce a drive of the transgene within 20 generations 42. The spread of 
MEDEA gene drives by migration between populations is further explored by Marshall et 
al. 41, indicating the MEDEA gene drive may be locally contained when a very high fitness 
cost (50%) is applied to MEDEA-bearing individuals, with 1% of the population migrating 
every generation. 
Toxin-antidote gene drives, such as those utilized by maternal-effect lethal 
underdominance (UD), use a combination of two toxin-antidote pairs, where the toxin is 
located on one allele with the antidote located on the another43. Both toxins are maternally-
linked, with progeny requiring the antidote in order to achieve zygotic rescue. Two-
population modeling presented by Akbari et al.43 indicate this gene drive is containable 
within a single population when migration rates are below 4% per generation. If migration 
rates are increased above this threshold, the drive is lost from the both populations since 
the migration of wild-type individuals into the transgenic release population results in the 
frequency of transgenic individuals falling below the threshold required for a successful 
drive43. 
Gene drives such as CRISPR, MEDEA, and UD allow for transgenes to “drive” 




for achieving gene drive in a wild-type population vary across mechanisms, the 
introduction of an adequate number of gene drive organisms could transform entire species 
if not contained.  
 
Self-Eliminating Mechanisms 
The growing public concern over the use of genetic modification has prompted the 
evaluation of methods to effectively remove transgenic segments of DNA from the 
genome of genetically modified organisms. Deletion of transgenic sequences has been 
demonstrated through transposition, recombination, and single-strand annealing.  
Transposons or transposable elements are segments of DNA that are capable of 
moving between locations on a strand of DNA, facilitated by transposases binding to 
inverted terminal repeats (ITR), leaving a scarless excision site. P elements in Drosophila, 
have been shown to be high efficient and precise in site specific insertion and excision50,67. 
The piggyBac transposable element, isolated from the cabbage looper moth, has been 
demonstrated in a variety of agriculural47–49 and human stem cell applications46,68–70, to 
show that piggyBac transposons can also facilitate precision insertions and excisions. 
Furthermore, excision competent/integration defective piggyBac transposases have been 
developed to facilitate reversible transgenesis without harmful transposon reintegration 
and have the potential to improve the safety and utility of delivery methods for therapeutic 
genes45. 
Recombination allows for the removal of DNA segments located between two 




recombination leaves behind a single target. Recombination has been allowed for targeted 
genome manipulation in Aedes aegypti through recombinase mediated cassette exchange 
(RMCE) utilizing Cre and FLP recombinases51,71 with uses in vector control and pathogen 
transmission.  
Several applications of recombinases in plants have been evaluated to limit the 
expression of traits to necessary parts of the plant to create hybrid transgenic plants44,54. 
Using Cre/lox mediated recombination, marker genes and redundant transgenes were 
removed from pest resistant (Bacillus thuringiensis) rice lines72 and limited the expression 
of the pest resistant protein to the green tissues73. The efficiency of marker genes excision 
using Cre/lox mediated recombination has also been explored in barley showing cold 
temperatures were most efficient for increasing recombination frequency52. The use of the 
Cre recombination was also highly efficient method for marker gene excision in 
Arabidopsis53,74,75. Similarly, the combination of the Cre/lox and FLP/FRT systems was 
capable of producing non-transgenic pollen and seeds from transgenic tobacco plants55 
and aspen76 at increased efficiencies. In the same way, the use of Bxb1 recombinase in 
switchgrass has demonstrated the excision of transgenes77. By limiting the expression of 
the transgene in the pollen of reproducing plants, the gene dispersal and subsequent cross 
pollination with closely related species can be reduced. Furthermore, restricting the 
transgene to non-consumable parts of the plant, the safety concerns regarding genetically 
modified food may be mitigated and increase consumer confidence44. 
The excision of transgenes homing endonucleases (HEs) occurs when two DNA 




by the direct repeats, SSA reconnects the ends of the DNA, resulting in the loss of the 
genetic material between the two cuts. This approach of genetic excision has been 
demonstrated in yeast78,79 and Aedes aegypti56,57, showing that the removal of transgenic 
DNA was achievable through SSA.  
Through these self-eliminating mechanisms, specific segments of transgenic 
material can be removed from the DNA of an organism. Additionally, the use of these 
mechanisms can allow for the creation of hybrid organisms, only expressing the transgene 
in certain locations.   
 
Modeling 
The models for the evaluation of gene drive mechanisms can be characterized into 
two main groups: small-scale stochastic models and large-scale deterministic models. One 
of the earliest deterministic gene drive models was demonstrated by Austin Burt in 2003, 
modeling a large, randomly mating adult population39. To find equilibrium points within 
the HEG drive construct, Burt evaluated the impacts of transmission-ratio distortion 
(TRD) to identify feasible fitness costs necessary to produce a viable drive into the wild-
type population39. This approach has formed the basis for many frameworks modeling the 
dynamics of various gene drive constructs, including MEDEA42, X-shredders40, and 
CRISPR/Cas9 systems80,81.  
Expansion of these models for CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene drive reversal 
strategies through the use of synthetic resistance alleles, reversal drives, and immunizing 




stopping the HEG drives82. Multiplexing gRNAs for the CRISPR/Cas9-based homing 
systems, Noble et al. developed deterministic models for the evolution of a large 
population where a drive construct was introduced63. The theoretical results demonstrated 
the use of five gRNAs for the homing drive would be capable of reducing the rate of 
resistance allele formation, resulting in the fixation of the transgenic drive construct within 
the population63.  Marshall et al. further modified the model structure by dividing the 
mosquito life cycle into four life stages (egg, larva, pupa, and adult), modeled both male 
and female adults, and utilized a discrete daily time step83. The model utilized density-
independent mortality rates for all life stages, with an additional density-dependent 
mortality rate applied to the larval stage, limiting the growth of the population. The results 
of this modeling effort show the population suppression is expected to be short-lived, 
despite high rates of homing in the germline83.  
Due to the computationally intensive nature of stochastic models, environmental 
releases of gene drive organisms have relied heavily on the use of deterministic models to 
capture the magnitude of individuals involved. In this way, stochastic modeling has been 
utilized to support results from deterministic modeling and exploring other possible 
outcomes of smaller scale laboratory experiments.  Using both deterministic and stochastic 
two-population models, Marshall and Hay consider the dynamics in both small and 
infinitely large, randomly mating populations for toxin-antidote and killer-rescue gene 
drive systems41. According to this modeling framework, Akbari et al. explore single- and 
two-locus configurations of maternal-effect lethal underdominance to analyze the spread 




stochastic models were developed and run multiple times for small populations with a 
maximum of 650 Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes, seeding 25% of the starting population 
with doublesex gene drive carrying males64. In this model, random mating was assumed. 
To limit the model population size, a sample of 650 eggs were randomly selected at each 
generational step in the model64. 
The type and structure of the model that is used in modeling can determine the 
level of detail that is captured. Since deterministic assume homogeneity throughout a 
population or subgroup of a population, the level of detail that is capture is limited to a 
high level. Stochastic models, such as agent-based models, allow for individual behaviors 
and traits. However, because deterministic models do not look at the behaviors of 
individuals, large-scale models are possible with significantly less computational 
resources than stochastic models. Since deterministic models follow series of differential 
equations, the mathematical representation of the population may result in extreme cases 
that would be likely removed in stochastic models due to randomness.   
In this study, we utilize a deterministic model to capture the dynamics of an 
infinitely large population that consists of juvenile and adult populations with 
equiprobable mating rates between all genotypes to capture the dynamics of SEM-GDs 




CHAPTER II  
CRISPR-SEM 
In heterozygous individuals, an active CRISPR gene drive introduces a double-
stranded DNA break at the homologous position on the wild-type chromosome at 
probability q, with homology-dependent repair resulting in copying the transgenic 
material from the transgenic chromosome at probability p. Thus, heterozygous individuals 
with one transgenic allele and one wild-type allele are converted into transgenic 
homozygous individuals at probability qp. Based on previous work on highly active 
CRISPR/Cas9-based gene drives 63, we set q and p accordingly for all scenarios (q = p = 
0.95). Where break repair does not occur via HDR, the formation of resistance alleles that 
preserve (δ) or disrupt (1-δ) the function of the target gene with corresponding impacts on 
fitness of the organism are formed, denoted as u and r, respectively.  
We modified existing models for homing-based gene drives by considering three 
possibilities that might occur prior to any homing events in the germline of the target 
organism. Successful self-elimination is given as (α), and results in the formation of an 
allele (v) that is resistant to the homing drive. We also considered that any SEM will break 
down and become permanently non-functional with probability (γ). If neither of these 
events occur, the transgene remains as is with probability (β), where α + β + γ =1. The six 
different alleles considered in the deterministic model are shown in Figure 1 and the 
structure and probabilities of our model and their relation to the various alleles are shown 





Figure 1. Six different allele types considered by our deterministic model. Two alleles 
contain the CRISPR/Cas9 gene drive (GD), Marker (M), Cargo (C) and either 
functional (g) or defective (s) self-elimination mechanism. Four alleles are free of 
transgenic sequences and include wild-type, CRISPR-susceptible (w), wild-type, pre-













CRISPR Single Self-Elimination gRNA Target Site with Single Homing Drive 
gRNA Target Site 
By pairing a self-elimination mechanism with the CRISPR gene drive, we explore 
the possibility of stopping and reversing the effects of the homing drive propagating 
through the population. With a single gRNA target sight for successful excision, the SEM 
can only undergo one imperfect excision or mutation (with probability γ) before the 
transgene is permanently fixed. Likewise, the Cas9-induced homing drive can only 
undergo a single DSB repair by NHEJ before the homing drive target gRNA target site is 




For each of the gene drive mechanisms, we developed a system of delayed 
differential equations to predict the number of offspring generated during each time step. 
The results were generated by running system dynamics models utilizing the differential 
equations generated. Malthusian population growth was assumed with a daily time step 
through the models. The model structure was adapted for each SEM-GD scenario based 
on the work conducted by Najmitabrizi84. Differential equations were concatenated and 
analyzed using MATLAB 2017b. Plots were generated using Python 3.7.  
The system dynamics models returned the number of adult and juvenile individuals 
of each genotype for every time step throughout the simulation. Initial model parameters 




Table 1. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description Value 
λ Female reproduction rate (per day) 7 
σ Proportion of female offspring 0.5 
𝑐𝑖 Fitness cost of genotype i Varies 
𝜇𝐴 Adult mortality rate (per day) 0.3 
𝜇𝐽 Juvenile mortality rate (per day) 0.03 
η Development time (in days) 12 
 
Using the fitness costs associated with each genotype and sex, adult and juvenile 
mortality rates were adjusted such that the mortality rate could not be more than 1, giving 
us: 
𝜇𝐴𝑖 =  
𝜇𝐴
(1−𝑐𝑖)
  for  (1 − 𝑐𝑖) ≥  𝜇𝐴, otherwise 𝜇𝐴 = 1 
𝜇𝐽𝑖 =  
𝜇𝐽
(1−𝑐𝑖)
  for  (1 − 𝑐𝑖) ≥  𝜇𝐽, otherwise 𝜇𝐽 = 1 
Mortality rates were applied at each time step, where the surviving number adult 
individuals of each genotype Ai(T) was calculated by reducing the number of adult 
individuals of each genotype at the previous time step Ai(T-1) by the mortality rate, such 
that: 





Juvenile mortality was applied at the time the juveniles became adults, where the 
number of juvenile individuals surviving the development period was defined as: 
 𝐽𝑖(𝑇 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜇𝐽𝑖)
𝜂 
Combining the surviving adults with the fully developed juveniles (also now 
adults), the number of adults with a particular genotype at time T can be defined as the 
number of adults surviving a single time increment (from time T-1) and the number of 
surviving juveniles (from time 𝑇 − 𝜂), such that: 
𝐴𝑖(𝑇) =  (1 − 𝜇𝐴𝑖)𝐴𝑖(𝑇 − 1) +   𝐽𝑖(𝑇 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜇𝐽𝑖)
𝜂 
The number of females with a particular genotype Fi was directly used in 
calculating the number of offspring produced. Since males do not directly produce 
offspring, the proportion of adult males with a particular genotype Mi was calculated such 
that: 






Utilizing the equations generated for the calculation of the number of offspring of 
each genotype, the fitness costs, initial input, self-elimination (α, ß, γ), and the gene drive 
mechanism parameters (provided in Table 2), the number of offspring created for each 












Table 2. Gene drive mechanism parameters 
 
Gene Drive Mechanism Parameter Description Value 
MEDEA Ω 
Proportion of non-transgenic offspring 




Proportion of non-transgenic offspring 
surviving from toxin A 
0.05 
Ω𝐵 
Proportion of non-transgenic offspring 
surviving from toxin B 
0.05 
CRISPR 
q Probability of Cas9 cut to cause DSB 0.95 
p Probability of successful HDR 0.95 
δ 
Probability of functional allele 





A two-dimensional matrix was generated of all the possible genotypes of 
females (𝐹𝑖) and males (𝑀𝑖). A third dimension was added to capture every possible 
outcome of offspring (𝑔𝑖). The value of each index within this three-dimensional matrix 
corresponded to the probability that the combination of the two parental genotypes would 
produce the respective offspring of the genotype. For example, a female with the ww 




ws with a probability of 0.5. Hence, the resulting value of the index that corresponded to 
(ww female, ws male, ws offspring) = 0.5, or Ψ(𝑔𝑖 | 𝐹𝑖, 𝑀𝑖) =  0.5. Iterating through all 
possible combinations of 𝐹𝑖, 𝑀𝑖, and 𝑔𝑖, a matrix of probabilities was generated. It was not 
uncommon that a particular index had a value of 0, since a particular mating combination 
of male and female genotypes could only result in certain offspring genotypes.  
Once the matrix was fully populated, a string was concatenated with the parental 
genotypes and probability of producing an offspring, resulting in the form: 
𝐹𝑖 ∗ Ψ(𝑔𝑖 | 𝐹𝑖, 𝑀𝑖) ∗ 𝑀𝑖 
This would be utilized in the calculation of the number of offspring in the system 
dynamics model. All combinations of parental genotypes to create a particular offspring 
genotype k were concatenated in the form: 






Equations were simplified using MATLAB’s str2sym function to reduce the 
additional computations necessary when referencing and calculating equations from the 
system dynamics model. To calculate the daily number of offspring of genotype i that 
were being produced, daily reproduction rates, sex ratio, and fitness costs were 
additionally concatenated into the equation following the simplification of the equations, 
for females giving: 
𝜕𝑔𝑖
𝜕𝑡










and for males: 
𝜕𝑔𝑖
𝜕𝑡






In the case of a single gRNA target site with a single chance for self-elimination, 
six alleles (w, v, g, s, u, and r) were utilized creating 21 possible genotypes. The presence 
of a g allele allowed for self-elimination, producing v, g, or s alleles with probabilities α, 
ß, and γ, respectively. If a transgenic allele (g or s) was present with a w allele, a DSB 
could occur with probability q. The v, u, and r alleles have lost the gRNA target site and 
therefore cannot be cut by Cas9. The probabilities of inheritance are initially presented by 
Noble et al.63 and modified here to include the self-eliminating mechanism. 
The probability that gametes are passed from parents to progeny is defined as 
follows: 
• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) and the wild-type allele w will produce 
resistant and wild-type gametes equiprobably such that we have: 




• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s 
will produce resistant and permanently fixed transgenic gametes equiprobably such 
that we have: 








• Individuals with the resistant allele v with transgenic allele g will produce resistant 





• Individuals with wild-type allele w or resistant alleles u or r with transgenic allele g 
will produce resistant gamete v such that: 




• Individuals with resistant alleles u or r with transgenic allele g will produce resistant 
gametes u or r such that: 




• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) with transgenic allele g will produce 
transgenic gamete g when self-elimination and permanent fixation does not occur such 
that: 




• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) with transgenic allele g will produce 
permanently fixed transgenic gamete s when permanent fixation occurs such that:   









• Individuals with wild-type allele w and transgenic allele g will produce wild-type 
gamete w when successful self-elimination excision occurs or when self-elimination 
does not occur and no cutting of the target site occurs such that: 
𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑤 =
𝛼 + (1 − 𝑞)(ß + 𝛾)
2
 
• Individuals with wild-type allele w and transgenic allele g will produce transgenic 
gamete g when successful self-elimination excision does not occur or permanent 
transgene fixation does not occur. Through cutting and HDR, the transgenic material 
is copied onto the w allele such that:   
𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑔 =
 (1 + 𝑞𝑝)(ß)
2
 
• Individuals with wild-type allele w and transgenic gamete g will produce resistant 
allele u when successful self-elimination excision does not occur or permanent 
transgene fixation occurs. Through cutting and NHEJ a functional resistant allele is 
produced such that:  
𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑢 =
(ß + 𝛾)𝑞(1 − 𝑃)𝛿
2
 
• Individuals with wild-type allele w and transgenic allele g will produce resistant 
gamete r when successful self-elimination excision does not occur or permanent 
transgene fixation occurs. Through cutting and NHEJ a nonfunctional resistant allele 
is produced such that:  
𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑟 =






• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 





• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce permanently fixed transgenic gamete s through cutting and HDR, when the 
transgenic material is copied onto the w allele such that we have: 




• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete u through cutting at the target site with probability q and 
NHEJ with probability 1-p, repairing the cut to form a functional allele with 





• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete u through cutting and NHEJ, repairing the cut to form a 
function allele with probability δ, such that:  
𝑃𝑤𝑠,𝑟 =  
𝑞(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛿)
2
 
Each of the alleles and probabilities for males and females were calculated and 
stored. By combining the two alleles (one from each parent) and multiplying the 
probabilities of the two alleles together, the probability that an offspring with a particular 





The single self-elimination target site with a single gRNA target site allows for a 
single chance for the self-elimination mechanism to remove the transgenic material and a 
single chance for Cas9 to cause a DSB. We assumed a fitness cost of 5% per transgenic 
allele g and s. A fitness cost due to the disruption of gene function associated with the 
homologous r alleles was set as 5%, according to the parameters established in Noble et 
al. 63. A 1% release of homozygous transgenic gg males into a population consisting of 
99% wild-type (ww) males and females was used.  
When the SEM is inactive (α = γ = 0) and there is a high probability for the 
formation of functional resistance alleles (δ = 0.33), the transgene quickly drives into the 
population, reducing the proportion of wild-type individuals as shown in Figure 3. Since 
the resistance alleles u and r are not susceptible to reinvasion of the transgene and because 
the functional resistance alleles u do not have an associated fitness cost, the u alleles begin 
to restore the wild-type population due to their competitive advantage over the transgenic 
alleles. As the formation of functional resistance alleles u becomes more difficult (δ 






Figure 3. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of gene 
drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different rates 
of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) where γ = 0.01 
 
 
Figure 4. Allele frequency following a simulated release of gene drive containing 
individuals at 1% of the wild-type with no transgene self-elimination (α = γ = 0) 
across four values of functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 0.01, 0.10, 0.33) 
 
With an active SEM (α > 0, γ > 0) and successful transgene excision, the transgenic 
material from the g alleles is removed, resulting in the formation of v alleles. Since α 
corresponds to the probability that the transgenic material will be successfully removed 
from the g allele, we expect to observe faster removal of the transgene and restoration of 
the wild-type population. However, we observe a counterintuitive phenomenon, where 




type population, as shown in Figure 5. In all cases, the restoration of the wild-type 
population depends on the creation of resistance alleles (v, u, r) that cannot be reinvaded 
by the homing drive. Because we cannot limit the formation of permanently-fixed 
transgenic alleles s that form with probability γ, we must assume γ > 0 which will result 
in the formation of s alleles.  
 
 
Figure 5. Allele frequency within a simulated release of gene drive containing 
individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 
0.01, 0.05, 0.10), where δ = 0.33 
 
Under higher values of α, because the transgene g is removed very quickly, very 
few resistance alleles v are produced. Additionally, although the number of permanently-




present in the population, a large proportion of the population is not resistant to re-invasion 
of the GD. This creates a GD that can no longer be controlled by the SEM, resulting in the 
restoration of wild-type population depending increasingly on the formation of resistance 
alleles u and r. At lower levels of α, the transgene g persists for a longer period of time, 
creating more resistance alleles v at a slower rate. As the g allele mutates into the 
permanently-fixed transgene s over time, a significantly larger number of created 
resistance alleles v are present to stop the permanently-fixed GD and enable for a faster 
restoration the wild-type population. As δ is decreased, we observe a decrease in the 
number of functional resistance alleles u created and the restoration of the wild-type 








Figure 6. Allele frequency within a simulated release of gene drive containing 
individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and four rates of functional resistance allele formation 
(δ = 0, 0.01, 0.10, 0.33). For all plots, the rate of permanent failure of the self-
elimination mechanism is set to γ = 0.01. 
 
Evaluating the wild-type allele proportion of the population for 60 generations 
across a range of α and γ values, we confirmed that low α and low γ probabilities were the 
most effective for the restoration of the wild-type population. We further separated this 
parameter space with the original wild-type alleles w and created resistance alleles v, and 
compared this to the resistance alleles u and r that form through NHEJ following a DSB. 
As shown in Figure 7, at low α and γ values, a significant proportion of the wild-type 
population can be attributed to the creation of v alleles as a result of the transgenic excision 




w and the created resistance allele v resemble the total wild-type allele proportion while 
the proportion of resistance alleles u and v decreases.  
 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations at four rates of 
functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 0.01, 0.10, 0.33) 
 
A threshold for the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles in the population 
was generated to evaluate the potential bio-containment effectiveness of the SEM. 
Although the threshold increased as α increased, the level of containment was only 







Figure 8. Threshold of the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles at three rates 
of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10) and two rates of functional 
resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 0.33) 
 
A second scenario was investigated based on the findings shown by Kyrou et al.64, 
where the doublesex (dsx) gene was targeted. In this approach, females carrying two 
transgenic alleles (gg, gs, ss), two nonfunctional resistance alleles (rr), or a combination 
of the transgene and nonfunctional allele (gr, sr) will not survive. We applied a fitness 
cost of 100% to the females with these genotypes and retained the fitness costs from the 
prior approach for males. Additionally, δ = 0, since no functional resistance alleles u were 
observed. 
An inactive SEM (α = γ = 0) resulted in a successful drive of the transgene into the 
population and ultimately caused the population to crash (shown in Figure 9). Since no 




driving into the population. As drive progresses, the population becomes increasing male-
biased due to the mortality of females carrying two copies of the transgene or 
nonfunctional resistance allele, causing the number of individuals to decrease over time.  
 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of dsx 
gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different 
rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) where γ = 0.01 
 
When the SEM is active (α > 0, γ > 0), we observe similar trends of lower α 
restoring the wild-type population at a faster rate than higher α due to longer persistence 
of the transgenic allele g and the subsequent creation of more resistance alleles v. In this 
case, no functional resistance alleles u are created and due to the mortality of females with 
rr, gr and sr genotypes, the nonfunctional resistance alleles r are primarily carried by 
males. As a result, the restoration of the wild-type population becomes increasingly 
dependent on the created resistance allele v. Even at higher values of α, the created v allele 
is the primary driver in the restoration of the wild-type due to the competitive advantage 
(0% fitness cost), as shown in Figure 10. Allele frequency within a simulated release of 




rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) where γ = 0.01. However, since 
the persistence of the g allele is increased under low values of α, more resistance alleles v 
are present to restore the wild-type population than under high values of α. 
 
 
Figure 10. Allele frequency within a simulated release of dsx gene drive containing 
individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) where γ = 0.01.  
 
Evaluating the parameter space across values of α and γ, we observe a complete 
restoration of the wild-type population under all combinations (with the exception of α = 
0, or when the SEM is inactive). Furthermore, we observe that this restoration of the wild-
type population is fully attributable to the natural wild-type and created resistance alleles 








Figure 11. Proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations for the dsx gene drive 
(δ = 0) 
 
The threshold plots show that lower thresholds are necessary for a successful drive 
of the transgene into the population at higher rates of transgene removal (shown in Figure 
12). The results indicate that a gene drive may be prevented when the threshold is up to 




Figure 12. Threshold of the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles with the dsx 
gene drive at three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10) and 






CRISPR Five Self-Elimination gRNA Target Sites with Single Homing Drive gRNA 
Target Site 
To limit a subsequent homing drive of the permanently-fixed transgene s following 
the removal of all excision-competent transgenes g, a five self-elimination target site 
construct was proposed. With five chances to successfully excise the transgenic segment 
of DNA, the rate of permanently-fixed transgene formation γ is significantly reduced. We 
apply a 5% fitness cost per transgenic allele, with individuals carrying a nonfunctional 
allele and resistance allele (gir, sr) having a 10% fitness cost. A 5% fitness cost was 
applied to individuals with two nonfunctional alleles (rr). Fitness costs were identical in 




The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single homing drive target site was extended for multiple chances for 
successful self-elimination. The model structure and function were otherwise unchanged. 
 
Equation Generation 
Using the structure of the single self-elimination cut with a single gRNA target site 
model, we introduced five self-elimination target sites modeled as g1-g5 (where n = 5), 
allowing for five chances for a self-elimination cut to occur. Along with the wild-type and 




and permanent transgene fixation follow a multinomial distribution, while Cas9 cutting, 
HDR, and NHEJ remain unchanged.  
The probability that gametes are passed to offspring from parents are as follows: 
• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) and the wild-type allele w will produce 
resistant and wild-type gametes equiprobably such that we have: 




• Individuals with resistant alleles (v, u, r) and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s 
will produce resistant and permanently fixed transgenic gametes equiprobably such 
that we have: 




• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 





• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce permanently fixed transgenic gamete s through cutting and HDR, when the 










• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete u through cutting at the target site with probability q and 
NHEJ with probability 1-p, repairing the cut to form a functional allele with 





• Individuals with wild-type allele w and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete u through cutting and NHEJ, repairing the cut to form a 
function allele with probability δ, such that:  
𝑃𝑤𝑠,𝑟 =   
𝑞(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛿)
2
 
• Individuals with the resistant allele v with transgenic allele gi will produce resistant 
gamete v through inheritance and self-elimination such that: 
𝑃𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑣 =
1 + (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑛−𝑖)
2
 
• Individuals with the wild-type allele w or the resistant alleles u or r with transgenic 
allele gi will produce resistant gamete v through inheritance and self-elimination such 
that: 
𝑃𝑤𝑔𝑖,𝑣 =  𝑃𝑢𝑔𝑖,𝑣 = 𝑃𝑟𝑔𝑖,𝑣 =
(1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑛−𝑖)
2
 
• Individuals with the resistant alleles u or r with transgenic allele gi will produce 
resistant gametes u or r such that: 







• Individuals with the resistant alleles (v, u, r) with transgenic allele gi will produce 
transgenic gametes gi such that: 




• Individuals with the resistant alleles (v, u, r) with transgenic allele gi will produce 
transgenic gametes gk such that: 






• Individuals with the resistant alleles (v, u, r) with transgenic allele gi will produce 
transgenic gamete s such that: 




• Individuals with the wild-type alleles w with transgenic allele gi will produce wild-
type gamete w such that: 
 𝑃𝑤𝑔𝑖,𝑤 =
(1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑛−𝑖)  +  (1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝛼𝑛−𝑖)
2
 
• Individuals with the wild-type alleles w with transgenic allele gi will produce 
functional resistant gamete u such that: 
 𝑃𝑤𝑔𝑖,𝑢 =
(1 − 𝛼)𝑛−𝑖𝑞(1 − 𝑝)𝛿
2
 
• Individuals with the wild-type alleles w with transgenic allele gi will produce 
nonfunctional resistant gamete r such that: 
 𝑃𝑤𝑔𝑖,𝑟 =







Since the number of self-elimination target sites does not have an impact when the 
SEM is inactive (α = γ = 0), the construct of five self-elimination target sites with a single 
target site for the homing drive produces identical results to the single self-elimination 
target site with a single gRNA target site (shown in Figure 3). The proportion of transgene-




Figure 13. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of five 
self-elimination target site gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type 
population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) for γ = 0.01 
and δ = 0.33 
 
When the SEM is active (α > 0, γ > 0), we observe a limited drive under α = 0.1, 
where only up to 60% of the population carries a transgene. Under α = 0.4 and 0.8, the 
drive is delayed beyond 40 generations from the time of the initial release (Figure 13). In 
Figure 14, the results presented from the single self-elimination target sites are intensified 




number of created resistance alleles v. Through the use of five self-elimination target sites, 
we were able to drastically decrease the initial rate of formation of permanently-fixed 
transgenic alleles s from γ to γn. However, γ was not decreased to γ = 0, allowing for the 
creation of permanently-fixed transgenic alleles s. Due to the deterministic nature of the 
model, the presence of these transgenic alleles would be enough to drive into the 
population, as shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Allele frequency within a simulated release of five self-elimination target 
site gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four 
different rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of 
permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10), where δ = 0.33 
 
Parameter space evaluation of the proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 




transgenic alleles from the population (shown in Figure 15). Reduction of δ decreased the 
number of functional resistance alleles u created and the wild-type population was restored 
primarily through the created resistance allele v. 
 
 
Figure 15. Proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations for five self-
elimination target sites at four rates of functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 
0.01, 0.10, 0.33) 
 
While the addition of self-elimination target sites did not prevent the formation of 
permanently-fixed transgenes, the threshold of transgene elimination was significantly 
increased at higher rates of transgene excision (α), as shown in Figure 16. The thresholds 
established indicate the five self-elimination target site construct could be an effective 





Figure 16. Threshold of the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles for five self-
elimination target site gene drive at three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 
0.01, 0.05, 0.10) and two rates of functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 0.33) 
 
Applying the five self-elimination target site construct to the dsx gene drive, we 
set the fitness cost for females carrying two transgenic, two nonfunctional resistance 
alleles, or a combination of transgenic and nonfunctional resistance alleles to 100%. 
Individuals carrying a single transgene were applied a 5% fitness cost and males carrying 
two transgenic alleles were assigned a fitness cost of 10%. A fitness cost of 5% was 
applied to males with two nonfunctional resistance alleles.  
Like the previous scenario, when the SEM is inactive (α = γ = 0), the results for 
the five self-elimination target site dsx drive were identical to the single self-elimination 
target site dsx drive (Figure 17). In both cases, the transgene drove into the population and 




surviving population was biased towards transgenic males, stopping the growth of the 
population. 
 
Figure 17. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of five 
self-elimination target site dsx gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type 
population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) for γ = 0.01 
and δ = 0 
 
When the SEM was active (α > 0, γ > 0), we observed a limited gene drive for low 
α values, where α = 0.1 resulted in faster elimination of the transgenic alleles than α = 0.4 
and α = 0.8. Compared to the previous (non-dsx) gene drive, the dsx gene drive 
demonstrated an increased proportion of transgene-free individuals when compared across 
respective α values. We observe for α = 0.4 and 0.8, the proportion of created resistance 
alleles v is very small before the natural wild-type alleles w are suppressed. However, 
following the drive of permanently-fixed transgene s, the created resistance allele v 
quickly restores the proportion of transgene-free individuals (Figure 18). This can be 
attributed to the high mortality rate of females with two transgenic alleles, which limits 





Figure 18. Allele frequency within a simulated release of five self-elimination target 
site dsx gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four 
different rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of 
permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10), where δ = 0 
 
The parameter space evaluation for the proportion of the wild-type alleles at 60 
generations indicated the wild-type population would be restored for the majority of α and 
γ values (Figure 19). Only the very low γ values did not indicate a full restoration of the 
wild-type alleles, since the drive of the permanently-fixed transgene s had not fully 






Figure 19. Proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations for five self-
elimination target sites dsx gene drive for δ = 0 
 
As in the previous gene drive for the five self-elimination target sites construct, the 
threshold for the elimination of the transgene was significantly higher than the initial 
release proportion, as shown in Figure 20, at high rates of transgene excision. This 
indicates the five self-elimination target site dsx gene drive could be utilized for 
biocontainment of the gene drive if the rate of transgene excision (α) was substantially 
high. 
 
Figure 20. Threshold of the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles for five self-
elimination target site dsx gene drive at three rates of permanent transgene fixation 





CRISPR Single Self-Elimination gRNA Target Site with Five Homing Drive gRNA 
Target Sites 
A proposed method by Noble et al.63 explored the use of multiple gRNA target 
sites to reduce the formation of resistance alleles. By utilizing multiple targets sites for the 
homing drive, the DNA of heterozygous individuals would have multiple chances for 
successful copying of the transgenic material onto the non-transgenic allele through HDR. 
We explored the multiple gRNA target site approach proposed by Noble et al. for five 
gRNA target sites, paired with a single self-elimination target site. Utilizing the fitness 
costs established by Noble et al., we set the fitness costs of all individuals carrying 
transgenes (heterozygous and homozygous) to 5% and individuals with two nonfunctional 




The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single homing drive target site was extended for multiple chances for 
successful HDR. The model structure and function were otherwise unchanged. 
 
Equation Generation 
Adding a single chance for self-elimination to the proposed drive presented in 
Noble et al.63, we introduced multiple resistance alleles u1-u5 and r1-r5, where u1-u4 and 




self-elimination mechanism, this produces 105 possible genotypes. As shown by Noble et 
al., a binomial distribution PK(k | n, i, q), is defined  as the probability given there are n 
total target sites, i are resistant to cutting and each of the non-resistant sites can be cut with 
probability q, such that: 
𝑃𝐾(𝑘 | 𝑛, 𝑖, 𝑞)  =  (
𝑛−𝑖
𝑘
)𝑞𝑘(1 − 𝑞) 𝑛−𝑖−𝑘  for 0 ≤ k ≤ n-i 
When two or more cuts occurred, Noble et al. assume the loss of all target sites between 
the outermost cut locations, defining PL(l | k, n, i) as the probability that l target sites are 
lost given k cuts, n target sites, and i resistant sites, where: 





)  for 2 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ n-i 
The probability that alleles are passed from parents to offspring are defined by the 
following: 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the permanently 
fixed transgenic allele s will produce permanently fixed transgenic gamete s through 
cutting at one or more target sites and HDR such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠,𝑠 = 𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑠,𝑠 =  𝑃𝑤𝑠,𝑠 =
1 + 𝑝(1 − (1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖)
2
 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the permanently 
fixed transgenic allele s will produce gametes ri, ui, and w, respectively, when no 
cutting occurs: 








• Individuals with resistance alleles ri and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete ri+1 when only one cut occurs and repair by NHEJ: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑠,𝑟𝑖 =
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1
2
 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s will 
produce resistant gamete rk when k-i target sites are lost and repair by NHEJ occurs 




∑ 𝑃𝐿(𝑘 − 𝑖 | 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑖)
𝑘−𝑖
𝑗=2
𝑃𝑘(𝑗 |𝑛, 𝑖, 𝑞) 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
permanently fixed transgenic allele s will produce functional resistant gametes ui+1 




𝛿(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
permanently fixed transgenic allele s do not produce uk gametes when k ≥ i +2, as 
cutting at two or more target sites would result in the loss of large segment of DNA, 
resulting in a nonfunctional resistance allele. Therefore: 






• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
permanently fixed transgenic allele s produce ri+1 alleles when a single cut occurs and 




(1 − 𝛿)(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
permanently fixed transgenic allele s produce rk gametes when a k-i (for i+2 ≤ k ≤ n) 





∑ 𝑃𝐿(𝑘 − 𝑖 | 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑖)
𝑘−𝑖
𝑗=2
𝑃𝑘(𝑗 |𝑛, 𝑖, 𝑞) 
• Individuals with resistance alleles v and the permanently fixed transgenic allele s 
produce resistant gamete v and transgenic gamete s equiprobably, such that:  




• Individuals with resistance alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the transgenic 
allele g will produce the transgenic gamete g if no collapse of permanent fixation of 
the transgene, cutting at one or more target sites and HDR occurs such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔,𝑔 = 𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑔 =  𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑔 =







• Individuals with resistance alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the transgenic 
allele g will produce the permanently fixed transgenic gamete s if permanent fixation 
of the transgene, cutting at one or more target sites and HDR occurs such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔,𝑠 = 𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑠 =  𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑠 =
𝛾 (1 + 𝑝(1 − (1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖))
2
 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the transgenic 
allele g will produce gametes ri, ui, and w, respectively, when no excision of the 
transgene and no cutting occurs such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔,𝑟𝑖 = 𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑢𝑖 =  𝑃𝑤𝑔,𝑤 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖
2
 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri and the transgenic allele g will produce resistant 
gamete ri+1 when there is no excision of the transgene, only one cut occurs and repair 
by NHEJ occurs such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔,𝑟𝑖 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝)(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1
2
 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ri and the transgenic allele g will produce resistant 
allele rk when there is no excision of the transgene, k-i target sites are lost and repair 
by NHEJ occurs (for i+2 ≤ k ≤ n) such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑔,𝑟𝑘 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝)
2
∑ 𝑃𝐿(𝑘 − 𝑖 | 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑖)
𝑘−𝑖
𝑗=2





• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
fixed allele g will produce functional resistant gametes ui+1 when there is no excision 
of the transgene, cutting at one target site and NHEJ with probability δ, such that: 
𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑢𝑖+1 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝)
2
𝛿(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
transgenic allele g do not produce uk gametes when k ≥ i +2, as cutting at two or more 
target sites would result in the loss of large segment of DNA, resulting in a 
nonfunctional resistance allele. Therefore: 
𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑢𝑖+2 = ⋯ =  𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑢𝑛 =  0 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
fixed allele g produce ri+1 gametes when there is no excision of the transgene, a single 
cut followed by repair through NHEJ which creates a nonfunctional resistance allele, 
such that: 
𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑔,𝑟𝑖+1 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝)
2
(1 − 𝛿)(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑞(1 − 𝑞)𝑛−𝑖−1 
• Individuals with resistance alleles ui or wild-type allele w (equivalent to u0) and the 
transgenic allele g produce rk gametes when there is no transgene excision, k-i (for i+2 
≤ k ≤ n) target sites are lost and repair by NHEJ creates a nonfunctional resistance 
allele, such that: 
𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑠,𝑟𝑘 =
(ß + 𝛾)(1 − 𝑝)
2
∑ 𝑃𝐿(𝑘 − 𝑖 | 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑖)
𝑘−𝑖
𝑗=2




• Individuals with resistant allele v and the transgenic allele g produce resistant gamete 





• Individuals with resistant alleles ri, ui or the wild-type allele w and the transgenic allele 
g produce resistant gamete v, when the excision of the transgene occurs such that: 






With an inactive SEM (α = γ = 0), the five target site GD is much stronger than 
the single target site case, driving into the population and dominates the wild-type 
population within 20 generations, as shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of five 
target site gene drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four 





When the SEM mechanism is active (α > 0, γ > 0), we observe a similar trend as 
in the single target site GD. As in the single target site scenario, as the rate of transgene 
excision (α) increases, fewer of the resistant alleles v are created, leaving a majority of the 
population susceptible to reinvasion by a subsequent drive of the permanently fixed 
transgene s. Furthermore, because the formation of functional resistance alleles u is 
significantly decreased through the use of five gRNA targets sites for the homing drive, 
the restoration of the wild-type population is dependent on the created resistance allele v. 
If the transgenic allele g is removed from the population too quickly, there are not 
sufficient numbers of created resistance alleles v to remove the permanently-fixed 
transgene s and restore the wild-type population within 60 generations (Figure 21). The 
allele frequencies in Figure 22 illustrate the limited number of resistance alleles u and r 
that are created and show the restoration of the wild-type individuals can be attributed to 






Figure 22. Allele frequency within a simulated release of five gRNA target site gene 
drive containing individuals at 1% of a wild-type population at four different rates 
of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent 
transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10), where δ = 0.33 
 
Parameter space evaluation highlights low values of α and γ to be the most 
effective for the restoration of the wild-type population and removal of the transgenic 
organisms within 60 generations. Further evaluation of the parameter spaces for varying 
rates of functional resistance allele (δ) show no distinguishable difference between δ = 0 






Figure 23. Proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations for a five target site 
GD-SEM at two rates of functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0, 0.33) 
 
The thresholds for removing transgenic alleles are not significantly decreased from 
the initial levels of released transgenic individuals and would allow for the transgene to 
drive through the population across all rates of transgene excision α (as shown in Figure 
24). While higher α values do eliminate the transgene at smaller thresholds, these threshold 
levels indicate this GD mechanism would not be suitable for containing an accidental 






Figure 24. Threshold of the maximum proportion of transgenic alleles with the five 
gRNA target site gene drive at three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 
0.05, 0.10) and one rate of functional resistance allele formation (δ = 0.33) 
 
 Discussion 
We have modeled the functionality of an SEM paired with three types of CRISPR 
gene drive constructs that evaluate combinations for multiple chances for self-elimination 
and drive of the transgene. We also explore the dynamics of a low-cost and a high-cost, 
sex-biasing gene drive paired with the SEM. The results highlight feasible parameter 
values for the rates of successful excision and rates of permanent fixation of the transgene 
for restoring the wild-type population within 60 generations for each of the gene drive 
constructs evaluated.  
By inducing a DSB and repair through HDR, the CRISPR gene drive increases the 
rates at which transgenic gametes are inherited by progeny. The creation of resistance 
alleles in cases where HDR fails would eventually limit the spread of the transgene due to 
the fitness cost associated with the transgene63,81. When the SEM was inactive, our results 
reflect the findings shown by modeling by Noble et al.63, where the drive would not 




alleles at a high rate δ. However, when the rate that functional resistance alleles are created 
decreases, the transgene persistence increases as fewer functional resistance alleles are 
created. By activating the SEM, our results show the transgene can be removed due to the 
creation of the resistance allele v that results following the excision of the transgene. As a 
result, regardless of how few resistance alleles are formed from NHEJ, the removal of the 
gene drive can be facilitated through the formation of the resistance allele v.  
While we expected high rates of transgene excision (α) to result in the most rapid 
restoration of the wild-type population, lower rates of transgene excision were most 
effective. Due to the permanent transgene fixation that could occur as a result of mutations 
in the target site of the enzyme or the enzyme binding site85, the rate of permanent fixation 
was assumed to be γ > 0. As a result, only alleles that have lost the target site of the drive-
inducing protein Cas9 will be resistant to cutting63,81,86. Since the more of the resistance 
allele v is created when the excision-competent transgene is present for a longer period of 
time, lower rates of transgene excision ensure more of the resistance allele v is created. 
Once a permanently-fixed transgene is formed, the drive can no longer be contained 
through the SEM, but relies on the formation of resistance alleles to restore the wild-type 
population.  
The proposed drive by Noble et al.63 suggested multiplexing of five gRNA target 
sites for the homing drive to reduce the rate at which functional resistance alleles were 
being created. As a result, the strength of the gene drive is significantly increased, allowing 
for the establishment of the transgenic alleles in the population83. Applying this approach, 




drove quickly into the population and the number of functional resistance alleles was 
significantly reduced. However, once active, the SEM was capable of restoring the 
transgene-free population through the creation of the resistance allele v. The results 
indicate the use of a single gRNA target site SEM is effective in reversing powerful gene 
drive mechanisms, without relying on the misrepair of DNA to form resistance alleles. 
Results from Kyrou et al.64 indicate the formation functional resistance alleles can 
be significantly decreased, allowing for the dsx allele to spread throughout the population. 
Additionally, since the two copies of the transgene or nonfunctional resistance allele 
results in the death of females, the population size decreases as the number of reproducing 
females diminishes. With an inactive SEM, our high-cost sex-biasing gene drive models 
demonstrated the spread of the transgene and the subsequent decline in the number of 
individuals in the population. An active SEM was capable in reversing the dsx gene drive 
through the creation of resistance alleles v that would enable the restoration of transgene-
free individuals. We also observed a rapid restoration of the wild-type population 
following a drive of the transgene for all rates of transgene excision. This was primarily 
because the only surviving females following the drive of the transgene carried the 
resistance allele v, allowing for a rapid spread of this resistance allele. 
The CRISPR-SEM demonstrated the ability to reverse the drive of a transgene. 
While higher rates of transgene excision removed the excision-competent transgene 
quickly, this was not able to prevent a subsequent drive of the permanently-fixed 
transgene. In the single SEM gRNA target site models, since the threshold of transgene 




method to prevent transgenic fixation was driven by the creation of a homing drive 
resistance allele that would allow transgene-free individuals to outcompete the transgenic 
individuals. Because the threshold for prevention of the homing drive was approximately 
two orders of magnitude below the initial release threshold at the highest rate of transgene 
excision, this may not be a sufficient construct for biocontainment of a gene drive carrying 
organism.  
When five SEM gRNA target sites were modeled, the drive of the permanently-
fixed transgene could not be prevented, however, the significant delay of the transgenic 
drive indicated a significant amount of the transgene had been eliminated through the SEM 
mechanism. Depending on the threshold for elimination of the gene drive87, this may be a 
suitable construct for biocontainment and preventing a gene drive from escaping into the 
environment when the rate of transgene excision is high.  
The CRISPR-SEM showed a trend of partial gene drive under low rates of 
excision. This enabled the transgene to partially drive into the population, before quickly 
decreasing and restoring the transgene-free population. While the impact of a fully 
transgenic population on the environment may be unknown, through this approach, the 
impacts could be limited to a fraction of the individuals for a short period. The subsequent 
removal of the transgene further diminishes the hazards of potential permanent effects the 
release of the gene drive individuals may have. This approach could serve as a useful tool 
for the pilot-testing of large transgenic populations in the environment and observing the 




Since gene-drive technology is designed to spread, the transformation of entire 
wild-type populations could be permanent and uncontainable, policy regulations must 
consider the possible public and environment health risks58–60,88. Our results demonstrate 
the potential for limiting the presence of gene drive organisms in the environment through 
the use of an SEM. While many of the hazards associated with the transgenic 
transformation of an entire natural population cannot be quantified, our proposed approach 
could serve as a measure of containing the accidental or deliberate release of gene drive 
organisms into the environment. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the pairing of the SEM 
and CRISPR gene drive mechanism, the transgenic transformation of large proportions of 
the population before the complete restoration of the wild-type could be utilized for the 
pilot-testing of transgenic organism behavior and short-term effects on the environment 
that transgenic organisms may have. 
The use of deterministic models provided a foundation for evaluating the dynamics 
of releasing a small proportion of CRISPR-SEM carrying individuals into a wild-type 
population. However, the assumptions of randomly mating populations, unlimited 
population growth, and no migration should be addressed in future work. Small-scale 
stochastic modeling will allow for the simulation of individual scenarios, but may not be 
representative of the behavior of populations in the environment. Through multiple 
stochastic simulations of cage trials, the likelihood of a permanently-fixed transgene that 
is not controllable by the SEM spreading throughout the population can be evaluated 





CHAPTER III  
MEDEA-SEM 
Utilizing a maternally-linked toxin, the MEDEA gene drive mechanism is biased 
against the wild-type offspring of transgenic females carrying the MEDEA construct by 
causing mortality to all offspring that do not inherit a transgenic allele. Pairing the GD 
with a SEM, we explore two possible outcomes following the excision of the transgenic 
DNA. We consider a non-resistant transgene collapse, where the transgene excision results 
in the formation of a wild-type allele w that does not provide the antidote to the maternally-
linked toxin. We also consider the formation of a resistance allele v that is created 
following the excision of the transgene that provides the antidote to the maternal toxin. 
For both scenarios, a fitness cost of 5% per transgene was assigned and only 5% of 
transgene-free offspring would be viable from transgenic females. 
 
Non-Resistant Transgene Collapse 
We consider the allele that is formed as a result of a successful excision of the 
transgene that is identical to the wild-type allele. This allele is considered non-resistant as 











The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single CRISPR homing drive gRNA target site was modified for the non-




For the formation of a non-resistant allele following the collapse of the transgene, 
three alleles are present: wild-type (non-resistant) w, excision-competent transgene g, and 
the permanently-fixed transgene s. In subsequent generations, the excision-competent 
transgene g is capable of excision, where the resulting allele formed is w (with probability 
α), and permanent fixation, resulting in the s allele (with probability γ). If neither of these 
occur, the transgene will remain excision-competent (with probability ß).  
The probability that gametes are passed from parents to progeny is defined as 
follows: 
• Individuals with a wild-type allele (w) and a permanently-fixed transgenic allele s 
will produce wild-type and permanently-fixed gametes equiprobably such that we 
have: 








• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele g 





• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele g 





• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele g 





• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce wild-type 
gametes w such that we have: 
𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑤 = 𝛼 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce excision-
competent gametes g such that we have: 
𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑔 = ß 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce 
permanently-fixed gametes s such that we have:  





• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 





• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 





• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 





To capture the MEDEA gene drive mechanism, an additional parameter was 
introduced to the model to induce mortality in the offspring from transgenic females. By 
capturing the female genotype, the decision to induce mortality could be applied 
accordingly. If the female was transgenic, the offspring genotype was evaluated for the 
presence of a transgenic allele (g or s). In the event that a transgenic allele was present in 
the offspring, no subsequent mortality was applied. However, if the offspring did not 
inherit a transgenic allele, a survival rate parameter was concatenated into the probability 
for the specific genotype, such that only a fraction (if any) of those offspring from the 








We modeled a variety of starting populations to understand the impact an SEM 
would have in controlling or reversing the MEDEA gene drive when the resulting allele 
of a successful transgene excision did not provide the antidote to the maternal toxin. We 
define w as the wild-type allele, g as the excision-competent transgenic alleles, and s as 
the permanently-fixed transgenic allele. With a release of 15% transgenic homozygous 
(gg) males into a population of wild-type males and females, the wild-type population was 
restored quickly when the SEM was active across all values of permanent transgene 
fixation (γ). Although an active SEM with higher rates of transgene excision (α) correlated 
with the rate at which the wild-type population was restored, an inactive SEM was also 
sufficient to begin the restoration of the wild-type population within 60 generations, as 
shown in Figure 25. Allele frequencies in Figure 26 show a decrease in the transgenic 








Figure 25. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
MEDEA-SEM containing males at 15% of a wild-type population at four rates of 
transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene 
fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.10, 0.20) 
 
 
Figure 26. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM containing 
males at 15% of a wild-type population with an inactive SEM (α = 0, γ = 0) 
 
As the starting population of transgenic males was increased to 25% and 33%, an 
active SEM with a low rate of permanent transgene fixation was necessary in order to 
restore the wild-type population. Increasingly higher rates of transgene excision were 
necessary as the rate of permanent fixation increased (Figure 27). An increase in the allele 




rate of transgene excision α must be sufficiently higher to counteract the rate of permanent 
transgene fixation γ to restore the wild-type population. 
 
 
Figure 27. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
MEDEA-SEM containing males at 25 and 33% of a wild-type population at four 
rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent 





Figure 28. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM containing 
males at 25% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 






Figure 29. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM containing 
males at 33% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 
0.01, 0.10, 0.20) 
 
Exploring the parameter space between the rate of transgene excision and the rate 
of permanent transgene fixation, we observe a distinct threshold between the restoration 
of the wild-type and removal of all wild-type individuals within 60 generations. As the 
initial starting population of males increased from 25% to 33%, the parameter space for 





Figure 30. Wild-type allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM 
containing males at 25 and 33% of a wild-type population after 60 generations 
 
Populations of larger releases of transgenic males and females were also explored, 
including starting populations consisting of 50, 75, and 100% transgenic males and 
females. As the starting proportion of transgenic individuals increased, the acceptable 
ranges of α and γ for the restoration of wild-type population decreased significantly, as 
shown in Figure 31. Figure 32-Figure 34 provide the allele frequencies for starting 
population of 50, 75, and 100% transgenic individuals, respectively. The parameter spaces 
of proportion of wild-type alleles after 60 generations for starting populations of 50, 75, 





Figure 31. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
MEDEA-SEM containing population at 50, 75, and 100% of a wild-type population 
at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of 






Figure 32. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM containing 50% 
of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 






Figure 33. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM containing 
population at 75% of a wild-type population at four different rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 






Figure 34. Allele frequencies of a simulated MEDEA-SEM containing population at 
100% transgenic individuals at four different rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 
0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 0.01, 0.10, 0.20) 
 
 
Figure 35. Wild-type allele frequencies of a simulated release of MEDEA-SEM 
containing males at 50, 75, and 100% transgenic individuals of a wild-type 






Resistant Transgenic Collapse 
We consider the allele that is formed as a result of a successful excision of the 
transgene that is equivalent to the wild-type allele, but provides the antidote to the 
maternally-linked toxin. This allele is considered as resistant as it provides the antidote to 




The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single CRISPR homing drive gRNA target site was modified for the 




For the formation of a resistant allele following the collapse of the transgene, four 
alleles are present: wild-type allele (non-resistant) w, resistance allele v, excision-
competent transgene g, and the permanently-fixed transgene s. In subsequent generations, 
the excision-competent transgene g is capable of excision, where the resulting allele 
formed is v (with probability α), and permanent fixation, resulting in the s allele (with 
probability γ). If neither of these occur, the transgene will remain excision-competent 




The probability that gametes are passed from parents to progeny is defined as 
follows: 
• Individuals with a wild-type allele (w or v) and the a permanently-fixed transgenic 
allele s will produce wild-type and permanently-fixed gametes equiprobably such that 
we have: 




• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele g 





• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele g 





• Individuals with a resistant allele v and an excision-competent transgenic allele g will 





• Individuals with a wild-type allele w or resistant allele v and an excision-competent 
transgenic allele g will produce excision-competent transgenic gametes g such that 
we have: 







• Individuals with a wild-type allele w or resistant allele v and an excision-competent 
transgenic allele g will produce permanently-fixed transgenic gametes s such that we 
have: 




• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce resistant 
gametes v such that we have: 
𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑣 = 𝛼 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce excision-
competent gametes g such that we have: 
𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑔 = ß 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles g will produce 
permanently-fixed gametes s such that we have:  
𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑠 = 𝛾 
• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 





• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 








• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele g and a permanently-fixed 





As in the MEDEA non-resistant scenario, if the female was transgenic, a mortality 
rate would be applied to all of the offspring that were not transgenic or did not inherit the 
v allele. Offspring that were not transgenic, but inherited the v allele would not have the 
MEDEA-induce mortality rate applied. 
 
Results 
We explore the creation of a resistance allele v, which provides immunity to the 
maternally-linked toxin, resulting from the successful transgene excision from the 
transgenic g allele in the MEDEA gene drive. We model the release of 15, 25, and 33% 
of the starting population as transgenic (gg) males, with the remaining population 
consisting of wild-type males and females. Similar to the non-resistant case, an inactive 
SEM (α = 0) results in a gradual restoration of the wild-type in the starting population of 
15% transgenic males and a successful drive of the transgene in the starting populations 
of 25 and 33% transgenic males. We observe the removal of the transgenic population in 
all cases when the SEM is active across all rates of permanent transgene fixation, as shown 






Figure 36. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
resistant MEDEA-SEM containing males at 15, 25, and 33% of a wild-type 
population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three 






Figure 37. Allele frequencies of a simulated release of resistant MEDEA-SEM 
containing males at 15, 25, and 33% of a wild-type population at four different rates 
of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and where γ = 0.20 
 
Modeling the release of transgenic males and females, the starting populations of 
50, 75, and 100% transgenic individuals demonstrated the ability of the SEM to restore 
the wild-type population when active across all starting populations (as shown in Figure 
38). Unlike the non-resistance transgene collapse scenario, the creation of the resistance 
allele v in the resistance transgene collapse case enables the restoration of the wild-type 
population across all starting populations. Figure 39 indicates the prevalence of the 





Figure 38. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
resistant collapse MEDEA-SEM containing population at 50, 75, and 100% of a wild-
type population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and 






Figure 39. Allele frequency with a simulated release of resistant collapse MEDEA-
SEM containing population at 50, 75, and 100% at four rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and where γ = 0.20 
 
Discussion 
The approach proposed by Marshall et al.41 explored the ability to confine the gene 
drive to a single population, using a conservative estimate of 1% migration per generation 
and showed confinement was achievable in the presence of a high fitness cost of c=0.5. 
As noted in the study, this is not a reliable mechanism to achieve containment of the gene 
drive, since studies have shown fitness cost to be lower than c=0.2 in Anopheles 
mosquitoes89. Chen et al.42 demonstrated the importance of fitness costs in models with 
starting proportions of transgenic males of 25%, where fitness costs of c=0.2 would result 
in the decrease of the MEDEA allele within 20 generations. Experimental results also 




of the MEDEA transgene throughout the population42. When utilizing the fitness costs and 
maternal toxin survival rates proposed by Chen et al.42, the release of 25% MEDEA 
bearing males into a population consisting of 25% wild-type males and 50% wild-type 
females showed identical trends when the SEM was inactive across all fitness costs. 
The non-resistant transgene collapse using a MEDEA gene drive mechanism 
demonstrated that a threshold starting population of more than 15% transgenic males was 
necessary to achieve transgene fixation in the population when the SEM mechanism was 
not active. Although our models did not explore the impacts of migration between multiple 
populations, the results indicate a release of 15% MEDEA bearing males will not be 
successful in establishing the transgene in the wild-type population, however larger 
starting populations of transgenic males would cause a drive. Similar results have been 
observed in previous modeling studies for equivalent fitness costs and release ratios90. At 
higher introduction rates of MEDEA-bearing males, fixation into the population was 
achieved when the SEM was not active.  
In the non-resistant scenario, the removal of the transgene would result in the 
formation of a wild-type allele that would not provide the antidote to the maternally-linked 
toxin, allowing for the drive to reoccur in future generations. While the rate at which 
MEDEA transgene was removed from the population depended on a combination of the 
rate of transgene excision and the rate of permanent transgene fixation. Since the 
permanently-fixed transgene behaved similarly to the cases of an inactive SEM, once the 
frequency of the permanently-fixed transgene exceeded 15%, a subsequent drive was 




competent transgene, more permanently-fixed transgenes were produced when the 
excision-competent transgenes remained longer in the population (due to a lower rate of 
transgene excision). As a result, scenarios considering high rates of transgene fixation 
required high rates of transgene excision to remove the transgene from the population. 
Likewise, increasing the starting proportion of transgenic individuals also required high 
rates of transgene excision to eliminate the transgene and restore the wild-type population. 
Due to the high starting proportions of transgenic individuals, the abundance of excision-
competent transgenes would cause an increased rate of permanently-fixed transgene 
formation that could not be controlled by the SEM. As a result, the excision-competent 
transgene had to be removed from the population before the permanently-fixed transgene 
frequency increased beyond 15% to ensure the prevention of the drive into the population. 
In the MEDEA-SEM scenario where the collapse of the transgene resulted in the 
formation of an allele resistant to the maternal toxin, the results were identical to those of 
the non-resistant MEDEA-SEM when the SEM was inactive. When the SEM was active, 
the population was restored under all starting proportions of transgenic individuals. Since 
the collapsed transgene provides immunity to the maternally-linked toxin, the progeny of 
transgenic females inheriting the resistance allele are resistant against drive and can 
proliferate the resistance alleles in future generations. Hence, even when the permanently 
fixed-transgene exceeded 15% (the level at which the drive was not preventable for an 
inactive SEM), the presence of the resistance allele created from the excision of the 
excision-competent transgene would allow for the restoration of the wild-type population. 




Containment of a gene drive mechanism is a major concern for public policy58,88. 
Along with previous studies41,90, our study results indicate a large number of individuals 
carrying the MEDEA construct would be required to cause a transformation of the 
population when a fitness cost is applied. Furthermore, with the introduction of a SEM 
with a probability for transgene excision in subsequent generations, the MEDEA gene 
drive construct could serve a powerful method of biocontainment to limit the hazards of 
an accidental gene drive carrying individual release into the environment.  
Utilizing a SEM would further reduce the likelihood of transgene fixation in the 
population when the probability of transgene excision is high and the rate of permanent 
transgene fixation is low when a non-resistant MEDEA construct is utilized and in across 
all rates of transgene excision and permanent fixation when a resistant MEDEA construct 
is used. In cases where the transgene was observed to drive into the population, the 
permanently-fixed transgenes (not controllable by the SEM) were the primary drivers. By 
reducing the likelihood that the transgene is permanently fixed, the drive of the transgene 
into the population is further reduced. 
Unlike previous studies41,90, we did not consider migration between multiple 
populations and limited our models to a single population. Future work will focus on 
modeling the spread of the MEDEA-SEM construct across multiple populations and the 
release, transgene excision, and permanent fixation parameters required for successful 




CHAPTER IV  
UD-SEM 
The maternal effect lethal under-dominance gene drive utilizes two maternally-
linked toxin-antidote pairs (referred to as toxin A and toxin B). Similar to MEDEA, 
transgenic females provide the toxins they express to their offspring, causing mortality 
within the offspring unless they inherit the complementary toxin-antidote allele. Offspring 
from transgenic females with both toxin-antidotes will need to inherit both toxin-antidote 
pairs to survive. Since individuals that inherit only one transgenic allele will suffer high 
mortality rates, the release of small proportions of transgenic individuals is not adequate 
to cause a drive of the transgene into the population. We assume the survival rate of each 
toxin to be 5%, where the survival rate is multiplicative when two toxin-antidotes are 
present in the female parent (hence the survival rate is 0.05 x 0.05 = 0.0025). Additionally, 
since there are two transgenes corresponding to toxin A and toxin B, we differentiate 
between the two excision-competent transgenes gA and gB, where the permanent fixation 
of the transgenes will result in permanently-fixed transgenes sA and sB, respectively. 
 
Single-Locus SEM 
We evaluate the dynamics of an UD-SEM construct where both toxin-antidote 
pairs are placed at the same locus. A total of 15 allele combinations (genotypes) were 
possible from the five alleles utilized. We assume a single chance for self-elimination of 







The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single CRISPR homing drive gRNA target site was modified for the single-
locus UD-SEM. The model structure and function were otherwise unchanged. 
 
Equation Generation 
For the dynamics of a single-locus UD-SEM model, five alleles are present: wild-
type w, excision-competent transgenes gA and gB, and the permanently-fixed transgenes sA 
and sB. In subsequent generations, the excision-competent transgenes gA and gB are 
capable of excision, where the resulting allele formed is w (with probability α), and 
permanent fixation, resulting in the sA and sB alleles (with probability γ), respectfully. If 
neither of these occur, the transgene will remain excision-competent (with probability ß).  
The probability that gametes are passed from parents to progeny is defined as 
follows: 
• Individuals with a wild-type allele (w) and a permanently-fixed transgenic allele sA 
or sB will produce wild-type and permanently-fixed gametes equiprobably such that 
we have: 









• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele gA 
or gB will produce wild-type gametes w such that we have: 




• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele gA 
or gB will produce excision-competent transgenic gametes gA and gB such that we 
have:  




• Individuals with a wild-type allele w and an excision-competent transgenic allele gA 
or gB will produce permanently-fixed transgenic gametes sA or sB such that we have:  




• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles gA or gB will produce 
wild-type gametes w such that we have:  
𝑃𝑔𝐴𝑔𝐴,𝑤 = 𝑃𝑔𝐴𝑔𝐵,𝑤 =  𝑃𝑔𝐵𝑔𝐵,𝑤 = 𝛼 
• Individuals with two identical excision-competent transgenic alleles gA or gB will 
produce excision-competent gametes gA or gB such that we have:  
𝑃𝑔𝐴𝑔𝐴,𝑔𝐴 = 𝑃𝑔𝐵𝑔𝐵,𝑔𝐵 = ß 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles gA and gB will produce 
excision-competent gametes gA and gB such that we have:  








• Individuals with two identical excision-competent transgenic alleles gA or gB will 
produce permanently-fixed gametes sA or sB such that we have: 
𝑃𝑔𝐴𝑔𝐴,𝑠𝐴 = 𝑃𝑔𝐵𝑔𝐵,𝑠𝐵 = 𝛾 
• Individuals with two excision-competent transgenic alleles gA and gB will produce 
excision-competent gametes sA and sB such that we have:  




• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele gA or gB and a permanently-
fixed transgene sA or sB will produce wild-type gametes w such that we have:  




• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele gA or gB and a permanently-
fixed transgene sA or sB will produce excision-competent transgenic gametes gA and 
gB such that we have:  




• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele gA and a permanently-fixed 





• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele gB and a permanently-fixed 









• Individuals with one excision-competent transgenic allele gA or gB and the opposite 
permanently-fixed transgene sA or sB will produce permanently-fixed transgenic 
gametes sA or sB such that we have: 




Once the final genotypes were derived, the female parent genotype was evaluated. If 
the female genotype was transgenic, the presence of toxins A and B were identified. 
Because the mortality rate could be impacted differently by each toxin, ΩA and ΩB were 
assigned as the survival rates of offspring exposed to toxins A and B, respectively. If the 
female was transgenic with the toxin A (gA, sA), the offspring must inherit the gB or sB 
alleles to survive. Otherwise, ΩA was concatenated to the probability of the offspring. 
Likewise, if the female was transgenic with the toxin B, the offspring must inherit the gA 
or sA alleles to survive; ΩB was concatenated to the probability otherwise. If the female 
was transgenic with both toxins, the offspring must inherit both transgenes to provide both 
antidotes. Inheritance of a single transgenic antidote would still result in the application 
of the missing toxin survival rate ΩA or ΩB. 
 
Results 
The single-locus scenario establishes the toxin-antidote pairs on the same 
chromosome. We assign a fitness cost of 5% per transgenic allele. The starting population 
consisting of 50% transgenic males and females (gAgB) with a wild-type population of 
males and females showed the removal of the transgenic individuals was possible across 




population of transgenic individuals to 75%, the restoration of the wild-type population 
was only possible with an active SEM. Lastly, a starting population consisting solely of 
transgenic individuals was only possible under combinations of high rates of transgene 
excision and low rates of permanent transgenic fixation. In a completely transgenic 
population, the rate permanent fixation of the transgene is the primary inhibitor of the 
wild-type population restoration. However, if the transgene is rapidly removed 
successfully through the SEM, the wild-type population is fully restored within 20 
generations. Figure 40 shows the proportion of wild-type individuals for the three starting 
populations across multiple levels of transgene fixation and excision, while Figure 41 
indicates the wild-type allele frequency after 60 generations for α and γ. Progressions of 
individual alleles for 50 and 75% transgenic starting populations are provided in Figure 





Figure 40. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
resistant collapse single locus UD-SEM containing population at 50, 75, and 100% of 
a wild-type population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) 






Figure 41. Wild-type allele frequencies of a simulated release of single-locus UD-
SEM containing individuals at 50, 75, and 100% transgenic individuals of a wild-
type population after 60 generations 
 
 
Figure 42. Allele frequency with a simulated release of single-locus UD-SEM 
containing population at 50 and 75% transgenic individuals at four rates of 






Figure 43. Allele frequency with a simulated release of single-locus UD-SEM 
containing population at 100% transgenic individuals at four rates of transgene self-
elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) and three rates of permanent transgene fixation (γ = 
0.01, 0.10, 0.20) 
 
Two-Locus SEM 
We explore the dynamics of a UD-SEM system where the toxin-antidotes A and B 
are located on separate loci. Six genotypes were possible per locus, yielding 36 allele 
combinations (genotypes) in both loci. As a result, several more viable transgenic 
genotypes were included. Similar to the single-locus case, we assume a single chance for 










The system dynamics model detailed in the methodology of the single SEM gRNA 
target site and single CRISPR homing drive gRNA target site was modified for the two-
locus UD-SEM. The model structure and function were otherwise unchanged. 
 
Equation Generation 
Compared to the single-locus UD model, the two-locus UD model has the same 
types of alleles present. However, we limit the A and B toxin-antidotes to separate loci, 
which limits the number of outcomes per locus. The equation generation for the two-locus 
model follows the single-locus equation generation for each locus independently, where 
applicable. For example a parent with a gAgA genotype on the first locus (in the two-locus 
case) will still produce the same gametes at the same rates as the gAgA parent in the single-
locus case, but a gAgB genotype would not be possible in the two-locus case since the toxin-
antidotes are on separate loci. Instead we have ww, wgA, wsA, gAgA, gAsA, and sAsA present 
on the first locus and ww, wgB, wsB, gBgB, gBsB, and sBsB present on the second locus.  
The probability that a combination of gametes passed to progeny is then calculated 
as the product of each gamete from each locus. For example, the rate at which an sA gamete 















Combining these two rates together, we can define the rate at which sA-w gametes will be 
inherited from gAsA-wgB parents as: 







Like the single-locus UD-SEM model, once the probabilities were calculated, the 
parental female genotype was evaluated. If the female was transgenic, the created 
genotype in the offspring was evaluated for the respective antidote(s) that were present in 
the female. If the antidote for the female toxin was not present in the offspring, only a 




In the two-locus case, the toxin-antidote pairs are placed on different 
chromosomes. As a result, the individuals can have multiple combinations of the possible 
toxin-antidotes that allow for survival. We assign a fitness cost of 2.5% per transgenic 
allele, such that individuals with four transgenic alleles (two on each chromosome) have 
a maximum fitness cost of 10%. The survival rate of transgene-free progeny of transgenic 
females remained unchanged.  
A starting population of 50% transgenic males and females was able to completely 




of transgene excision resulted in the spread of the transgene throughout the population, 
decreasing the number of wild-type individuals as shown in Figure 44. When the starting 
population of transgenic individuals was increased to 75%, high rates of excision were 
also capable of restoring the wild-type population. A starting population of 100% 
transgenic individuals was only able to restore the wild-type population when the rate of 
permanent transgene fixation was very small (γ < 0.01) and where the rate of transgene 
excision was high. Allele frequencies are provided in Figure 44-Figure 47 for 50, 75 and 







Figure 44. Proportion of transgene-free individuals with a simulated release of 
resistant collapse two-locus UD-SEM containing population at 50, 75, and 100% of a 
wild-type population at four rates of transgene self-elimination (α = 0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.8) 






Figure 45. Allele frequency with a simulated release of two-locus UD-SEM containing 
population of 50% transgenic individuals at four rates of transgene self-elimination 







Figure 46. Allele frequency with a simulated release of two-locus UD-SEM containing 
population of 75% transgenic individuals at four rates of transgene self-elimination 






Figure 47. Allele frequency with a simulated release of two-locus UD-SEM containing 
population of 100% transgenic individuals at four rates of transgene self-elimination 




Figure 48. Wild-type allele frequencies of a simulated release of two-locus UD-SEM 
containing individuals at 50, 75, and 100% transgenic individuals of a wild-type 






The underdominance system relies on a pair of maternally-linked toxin-antidote 
constructs that only ensure that offspring inheriting the antidote to the maternal toxin will 
survive. When both toxin-antidote pairs are located on the same locus, there are few 
offspring genotypes that are viable from the transgenic female. If the female is 
heterozygous transgenic (or homozygous transgenic with two copies of one toxin), the 
survival of the offspring becomes dependent on corresponding the paternal gamete that is 
inherited to provide the toxin to the antidote. Similarly, offspring of females carrying a 
copy of each transgene survive only if the gametes inherited from both parents will provide 
the antidote to both maternal toxins.  
Hence, assuming a high mortality rate induced by the toxin in the offspring of more 
than 95%43, the release of transgenic females would not be capable of inducing a drive of 
the transgene into the population. In order to spread throughout the population, a 
substantial number of transgenic males and females must be released, such that the number 
of surviving progeny from the mating between transgenic parents exceeds the number of 
progeny from wild-type parents. In the single-locus scenario, starting populations 
consisting of 50% transgenic males and females showed no drive of the transgene into the 
population across all rates of transgene excision and permanent transgene fixation. As we 
increased the starting population to 75% transgenic individuals, an inactive SEM was 
capable of inducing a drive. Once the SEM was active, the wild-type population was 
restored at all rates of transgene excision, with higher rates corresponding to faster 




Evaluating an entirely transgenic population, we observed that high rates of 
transgene excision and low rates of transgene fixation were necessary to completely 
remove the transgene from the population. In this case, we observed the formation of the 
permanently-fixed transgene as the primary inhibitor of the restoration of the wild-type 
population. As we observed in the 75% transgenic starting population, where only the 
inactive SEM resulted in a successful drive of the transgene, once the permanently-fixed 
transgenic allele frequency exceeded approximately 75%, the wild-type population was 
not restored. Since the formation of the permanently-fixed transgene could only result 
from the excision-competent transgene, a high rate of transgene excision was required to 
limit the formation of the permanently-fixed transgene to restore the wild-type population. 
Our results indicate that the SEM could be a potential mechanism for increasing the 
threshold at which transgenic individuals must be released to ensure a drive into the 
environment and may be sufficient for containing a transgenic population within an 
environmental release test site. Furthermore, if the SEM could be chemically 
suppressed91,92 until the transgene is permanently established in a population, subsequent 
chemical removal could trigger high rates of transgene excision and low rates of 
permanent transgene fixation to restore the wild-type population and remove the 
transgene. 
When each toxin-antidote was located on separate loci, multiple viable genotypes 
were created. In the two-locus case, starting populations of 50% transgenic individuals 
were capable of causing a drive of the transgene into the population when the SEM was 




drive was primarily due to the creation of the permanently-fixed transgenic allele. Since 
the permanently-fixed allele could only result from the presence of the excision-competent 
allele, the longer the excision-competent allele was present (due to a slower rate of 
transgene excision), the more permanently-fixed alleles were created. Further increases in 
the rate of permanent transgene fixation increased the number of permanently-fixed 
transgenes and wild-type population restoration was only possible at higher rates of 
transgene excision. This became more apparent when the starting transgenic population 
was increased to 75% and 100%. When the starting population was entirely transgenic, 
wild-type population restoration was only possible when the rate of permanent transgene 
fixation was very low (γ< 0.01) and the transgene excision rate was very high (α > 0.70). 
As demonstrated by previous work43, we expected the two-locus case to be a more invasive 
gene drive mechanism due to the increased number of viable genotypes. While the 
transgene is more difficult to remove, the addition of an SEM could be a viable approach 
to limiting the spread of the gene drive transgene. 
The results of both the single- and two-locus UD-SEM models reflected the 
findings demonstrated by Akbari et al.43 when similar fitness costs and starting 
populations were used and the SEM was inactive. Because each toxin provides a high 
mortality rate to the offspring that do not inherit the corresponding antidote, the UD gene 
drive mechanism requires a large release of both transgenic males and females to drive 
into the population and may be an ideal gene drive for testing in the environment41,43. 
While our model did not observe the impacts of migration, the high release thresholds 




migration rates are containable. A major concern of the policy surrounding gene drives is 
the ability to contain or prevent the spread of the transgene into wide spread areas58,60,88. 
Furthermore, the UD mechanism may provide a higher level of biocontainment (compared 
to MEDEA) in the case of a small release of transgenic organisms and could serve as a 
method of rapid wild-type population restoration (through chemical triggers) once a 
transgene was fixed in a population. 
 
 
CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
Gene drive mechanisms are an efficient approach to spreading transgenes that may 
limit the spread and transmission of vector-borne diseases in endemic areas34. However, 
due to the unknown and irreversible long-term consequences that gene drive mechanisms 
may pose to environment, the release of organisms possessing gene drive constructs has 
been highly debated and strictly limited58,60. Self-eliminating mechanisms have been used 
in agricultural applications to remove transgenic material from the pollen of transgenic 
plants to limit the hazards of cross-pollination with closely related species44 and in human 
gene therapy to limit deleterious reintegration of transgenic DNA45,46. We explored the 
limiting of a gene drive mechanism through the use of an SEM. 
By pairing a pre-programmed self-elimination mechanism with a gene drive 
construct, we identified effective probabilities of transgene removal and permanent 
transgenic fixation that would allow for the mitigation of the hazards associated with the 
permanent establishment of the gene drive transgene in the environment. We observed 
that the CRISPR GD mechanism could be delayed through the use of an SEM, however 
we could not prevent the drive from occurring. Counterintuitively, lower rates of transgene 
excision resulted in the restoration of the wild-type population faster than higher rates of 
transgene excision because the creation of resistance alleles v slowed when the transgenic 
population was eliminated too quickly. Multiplexing the SEM significantly increased the 
rate of transgene excision and proved to be a potential biocontainment mechanism at high 




threshold of a potential drive occurring by 6-7 orders of magnitude from the initial release 
of 1%. 
The MEDEA and UD GD mechanisms also showed promising results when paired 
with the SEM mechanisms. The initial releases of less than 50% transgenic individuals 
showed the wild-type population could be restored across a range of permanent fixation 
and excision rates. While increasing the starting populations did limit the acceptable 
excision and permanent fixation rates, high rates of transgene excision demonstrated that 
a GD-SEM construct could be utilized as a biocontainment measure. 
The use of a GD-SEM construct shows promise for being able to restore the wild-
type population and remove the transgene presence following the release of transgenic 
individuals into the environment. Gene drive technology can be a powerful and efficient 
tool for introducing a wanted trait into a population. However, this technology must be 
appropriately tested prior to its use in the environment. Public acceptance of gene drives 
will also play a key role in whether gene drives are utilized and the policy surrounding 
their use. Lastly, the regulation of this biotechnology will need establish guidelines for 
how testing and application in the environment will be conducted. While there are 
numerous technological, social and political aspects that must be addressed before the 
application of GD technology is utilized in the environment, the GD-SEM may play a 
major role in addressing the some of the concerns associated with the release of GD 







While results of this study provided a groundwork for the proof-of-concept that a 
GD-SEM construct would be effective in removing the presence of a transgene from the 
environment, there are several limitations that should be addressed with continuing 
research in this area. The models developed in this study were strictly deterministic as a 
theoretical foundation for the function of the GD-SEM system. Additionally, because the 
single population models utilized were unbounded and allowed to grow exponentially, the 
spread of the gene drive transgene was not limited by an availability of resources in the 
environment and may have propagated faster than a more constrained population with a 
finite carrying capacity.  
Future studies should also focus on the evaluation of stochastic models to explore 
the likelihood that the SEM construct will behave as expected when uncertainty is present 
in the model as shown by previous studies41,43,64. Additionally, utilizing a carrying 
capacity or density-dependent mortality rate similar to those used by Marshall et al.83 to 
limit the number of individuals in the population and to more accurately reflect the 
behavior of organisms in the environment may slow the rate at which the gene drive 
transgene is spread into the population. While a single population was used, migration 
between multiple populations should be utilized to explore how the transgene could spread 
geographically or be contained as shown by Akbari43 and others41. Environmental factors 
such as temperature have been shown to impact the development rates of mosquitoes and 




structure95–97 would more closely resemble the population dynamics of mosquitoes in the 
environment.   
Applications to public health should also be addressed. If this system was applied 
to limit the ability of mosquitoes or ticks to transmit pathogens, the impact on the 
prevalence of the disease in human and animal populations can be explored98–100. Multi-
population models driven by environmental factors would be significant to understanding 
the impacts this technology may have public health. The future direction of this research 
can explore a variety of applications for public health and policy to potentially eliminate 
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